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ABSTRACT 
Increased migration across the Mediterranean to Europe during 2015 was associated with 
growing interest in generating new research evidence to assist policymakers in 
understanding the complexities of migration and improve policy responses. In the UK, this 
was reflected in funding by the Economic and Social Research Council f o r  a 
Mediterranean Migration Research Programme. Drawing on evidence from the 
programme, this volume explores the nature of Europe’s ‘migration crisis’ and the extent to 
which the development of new migration management policies was grounded in evidence 
about the causes, drivers and consequences of migration to Europe. The authors conclude that 
there is a substantial ‘gap’ between the now significant body of evidence examining 
migration processes a n d European Union policy responses. This gap is attributed to three 
main factors: the long-standing ‘paradigm war’ in social research between positivist, 
interpretivist and critical approaches which means that what counts as ‘evidence’ is 
contested; competing knowledge claims associated with research and other forms of 
evidence used to construct and/or support policy narratives; and, perhaps most 
importantly, the politics of policymaking, which has resulted in policies based on 
underlying assumptions and vested interests rather than research evidence, even where this 
evidence is funded directly by European governments 
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Introduction 
On 18 April 2015, more than 800 people drowned in just one incident off the coast of 
Lampedusa, as they tried to cross the Mediterranean to Europe from the North African coast. 
It was one of the deadliest shipwrecks on record. Just a few days earlier, 400 people died 
when their overcrowded boat capsized just off the Italian coast, bringing the death toll to 
more than 1200 in a single week. Their deaths occurred during a period of increasing 
irregular boat migrations across the southern Mediterranean from Libya to Italy and a 
subsequent, and largely new, flow of refugees and other migrants crossing from Turkey to 
Greece.1 By the end of 2015, an estimated 3771 people had lost their lives crossing the 
Mediterranean trying to reach Europe.2 
 
Although people have been crossing the Mediterranean by boat since at least the late 
1980s (Baldwin-Edwards 2006), the events of 2015 prompted a series of political initiatives by 
European Union (EU) institutions under the guise of a new European Agenda on 
Migration in response to the ‘migration crisis’. As the number of people arriving on 
Europe’s shores continued to rise during the course of 2015, reaching an estimated 
1,008,616 by the end of the year, there was a simultaneous increase in the scale and intensity 
of political, policy and public concern. This was reflected not only in images of human misery 
and suffering that dominated newspapers, TV screens and social media feeds but also in 
growing public fears about the perceived economic, security and cultural threats of increased 
migration to Europe. 
 
Alongside the public outcry, various research bodies, the European Commission and 
international organizations – including the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) – all invested heavily in improving 
data and evidence production. This was intended to advance a better under- standing of the 
complexity of migration processes and, it was hoped, improve both the effectiveness and 
efficiency of policies themselves. The  IOM established a Global Migration Data Analysis Centre 
in Berlin and gathered data on deaths in transit, including previously neglected reporting on 
deaths at sea. The UNHCR, which had an under-developed statistical division that had 
frequently been surpassed by the work of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), also began to capture better data on flows and the 
distribution of refugees across Europe. The UK, Swedish, German and other governments 
also publicised their interest in gathering data and new empirical information that could guide 
policy approaches to migration in Europe. These developments signaled a step change in the 
reporting of migration flows to Europe and emphasised the importance of research-based 
evidence for managing migration. 
The commitment to evidence-based policy 
The focus on evidence-based policy (EBP) is, of course, nothing new. The term gained political 
currency in the UK under the Blair administration, starting in 1997 and was intended to 
signify the entry of a government with a modernising mandate, committed to replacing 
ideologically driven politics with rational decision making (Sutcliffe and Court 2005; Wells  
2007). For example, the Modernising Government White Paper (1999) states that: 
‘ … policy decisions should be based on sound evidence. The raw ingredient of 
evidence is information.  Good quality policymaking depends on high quality 
information, derived from a variety of sources – expert knowledge; existing domestic 
and international research; existing statistics; stakeholder consultation; evaluation 
of previous policies … ’ (Cabinet Office 1999, 31 cited in Wells 2007, 24). 
The pursuit of EBP is, therefore, based on the premise that policy decisions should be 
better informed by available evidence and should include rational analysis. This is 
because policies that are based on systematic evidence are seen to produce better out- 
comes. Such views are now commonplace among policymakers in the most developed 
states: as a result, we find that across the Global North, academic researchers are now 
increasingly tasked with demonstrating the relevance and significance of their research, 
with the quality of work measured in terms of the extent to which it has an ‘impact’ on 
policy (Gunn and Mintrom 2017). 
EBP has featured prominently in discourses on migration policy and as an instrumental – and 
at times controversial – tool for connecting academia and government. While policymakers 
may value the evidence produced by academics for its insights and potential 
recommendations, the applied nature of the enterprise also gives researchers access to 
government institutions and additional sources of funding. We note, for example, that 
the European Commission has directed much funding through the Directorate-General for 
Research and I n n o v a t i o n  t o w a r d s  g r o u n d -breaking r e s e a r c h  p r o j e c t s , 
including a  number of cross-regional studies of migration. Since 1994, approximately 80 
projects on migration have been funded within the Social Sciences and Humanities Research 
Framework Programme alone. This research has studied different aspects of the migration 
phenomenon, including immigrant integration, temporary/circular migration, trans- 
nationalism, migration and gender relations, migration and development, migration flows, 
migration data and statistical modelling, diversity, economic impacts of immigration, and 
transnational families.3 
Additional funding has been made available more recently under The Societal Challenge of the 
Horizon 2020 Programme: Europe in a Changing World4 and a raft of other initiatives (Green 
European Foundation 2016). As a result, there is now a great deal of migration-related 
research channeled through the Research Framework Programmes which aim to give a 
strategic input into European policymaking (EC 2009). In addition to occasional externally 
tendered projects through DG Home, the Commission draws on the resources of 
FRONTEX (since 2015, the European Border and Coast Guard) and the European 
Migration Network (EMN) to inform migration policy. However, there are important 
differences between these investments and those listed above. FRONTEX produces risk 
analyses that seek to inform and predict irregular migration flows, including refugee 
movements, and to this end has established a new FRONTEX Situation Centre (Carrera 
and den Hertog 2016). The EMN (essentially, a network of EEA government agencies) also 
has an applied focus and produces studies on specific policy areas, commissioned by DG 
Migration and Home Affairs, ‘to meet both the long-term and short-term needs of 
policymakers’ (EMN 2017). Both of these initiatives lack scientific independence and critical 
appraisal. 
In the UK, the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) responded to news of 
Lampedusa shipwrecks by issuing a call under its Urgent Research Grants scheme for pro- jects 
related to what was described as ‘the unfolding migration crisis in the Mediterranean’.5  
The stated purpose of the call was to ‘test and demonstrate the capability of the UK social 
science community to respond to urgent social crises’. The research was to focus 
primarily on the experiences of those who had made the journey to Europe with 
fieldwork to be undertaken quickly in order to ‘provide a robust evidence base to 
inform the development of policy and responses by governmental, inter-governmental 
and non-governmental actors’. At the time of the call, it was intended that ‘one, or possibly 
two’ projects would be funded under the scheme. However, between the call for proposals 
and decision about which projects would be funded, the ESRC was able to utilise significant 
additional resources. The source of the funding was the Global Challenges Research Fund 
(GCRF), a 5-year £1.5 billion fund drawn from the UK’s Official Development Assistance 
(ODA),6 and described by DFID as a prominent component of the UK’s Aid Strategy.7 This 
signaled both a commitment to EBP and the increasing use of development aid and 
financial assistance to manage migration, a theme to which we will return. 
In September 2015, the ESRC announced that eight projects would be funded to under- take 
research on ‘the Mediterranean migration crisis’ with a total budget of £1 million.8 The 
projects were directed by leading social scientists at the universities of Coventry, Durham, 
Queen Mary University of London, Loughborough, Middlesex, Warwick and York and 
involved significant collaboration with local researchers, NGOs and humanitarian agencies in 
Greece, Italy, Turkey and Malta. Some projects reached beyond areas of reception looking 
at settlements in Calais and along the migration corridor through Serbia, as well as 
eventual destination countries such as Germany. These projects were brought together to 
form the ESRC’s Mediterranean Migration Research Programme (MMRP). More than 100 
researchers were involved across the MMRP which conducted over 1000 interviews with 
refugees and other migrants, NGOs, humanitarian experts, and government officials 
from EU member states, as well as systematic analysis of migration policy developments 
within and across the countries of the EU. 
The articles in this Special Issue draw on evidence from this programme of research and 
explore the relevance of recent empirical data in formulating the EU’s policy responses to the 
so-called ‘migration crisis’. Three themes both cut across, and link, the articles in this 
volume: 
(1)  To what extent can we describe migration flows to Europe in 2015 as representing a 
‘crisis’? 
(2)  If the scale and nature of migration represents a ‘crisis’, to what extent did national 
and European policies respond in ways that alleviated the crisis and its underlying causes? 
(3)  What was the basis upon which new migration management policies were formed in 
response to the ‘crisis’? 
Drawing upon fieldwork in the Mediterranean region and selected sites across the EU, the 
contributors seek to provide answers to these questions and in so doing unpack some of the 
dominant assumptions that have guided migration policymaking and media reporting on the 
events that took place in Europe over the period 2015–2017. 
Migration trends and EU policy responses 
As noted above, irregular migration to Europe is not new: for more than 30 years, people 
have been crossing the Mediterranean by boat. Similarly, informal settlements from 
Sangatte to the ‘Jungle’ of Calais have appeared at critical crossing points for decades (see de 
Vries and Guild, this volume). Not only is this information known to students of 
contemporary European history, but also to EU institutions which, for almost 20 years, have 
been grappling with these migration challenges – as evidenced in the design of 
European migration policies. 
Since the 1999 European Council meeting in Tampere, the EU has expressed its ambition to 
develop a ‘comprehensive approach to migration’ including common policies on asylum 
and immigration. A central plank of this agenda has been to find effective ways to secure 
the external border of the EU and to prevent the onward movement of third country 
nationals9 through partnerships with countries of origin. The attempt to link internal and 
external policies reflected a greater interest in security which has been a constant theme 
of EU policymaking over the past 15 years. Since the 2002 Seville meeting, every European 
Council discussion on migration has emphasised the struggle to combat ‘illegal immigration’ 
and address ‘root causes’. To this end, the EU has made cooperation with third countries 
predicated on other commitments, including a series of readmission agreements that 
require third countries to readmit their own nationals without the right to remain on EU 
territory. 
Throughout the first decade of the twenty-first century, the European Council expanded 
partnerships with countries of origin and in so doing broadened the geographical reach of its 
campaign against irregular migration. EU states also cooperated with each other on intra-
state transfers as a result of the 1990 Dublin Convention, which entered into force in 1997, 
and later through further iterations of the Dublin legislation by Regulation, including Dublin 
II [EC 343/2003 of 18 February 2003], Dublin III [EU 604/2013] and in 2016 a proposed Dublin 
IV. Ten years after Tampere, the EU succeeded in establishing an asylum ‘acquis’ which 
includes legislation that seeks to align procedures and also promises the fair treatment of 
third country nationals.10 
The architecture of the EU’s external policies on migration, named the Global Approach 
to Migration and Mobility in 2005, included a number of programmes that sought to 
build partnerships with countries of origin where development aid and other forms of 
financial assistance were offered in return for cooperation in the struggle against irregular 
flows, trafficking and organised crime. Yet the claim that EU policy was developed to 
protect human rights was little more than a fig leaf (see Crawley and Blitz, this volume). 
Essentially, the core elements of European external migration policy became the 
‘externalisation’ of migration controls to transit and origin countries and ‘preventative 
measures’ designed to discourage or prevent the mobility of all but the most highly 
skilled. 
Throughout the period 2000–2011, the EU strategy of controlling sea borders with the 
cooperation of neighbouring countries appeared to be working. Irregular arrivals by sea 
hovered around 40,000 a year (Canary Islands, Straits of Gibraltar, Italian islands, Malta 
and Greece). By 2010, the western Mediterranean route had been more or less blocked, 
by means of the Spanish SIVE naval detection system and coastguard enforcement by 
Morocco and Tunisia. The central Mediterranean route had also been blocked with the 
2008 Italy–Libya Friendship Agreement – essentially, paying Libya’s dictator Q’addafi 
(Gadafi) significant funds to prevent the exit of refugees and other migrants from Libya, 
despite the lack of any protection (see Baldwin-Edwards and Lutterbeck, this volume). 
The only apparent vulnerable point in ‘Fortress Europe’ was the Greek– Turkish land 
border, which recorded around 48,000 entries for 2010. To address this gap, FRONTEX in 
October 2010 launched its first-ever RABIT (Rapid Border Intervention Team) operation on 
the Greek–Turkish land border. This was succeeded in 2012 by Greece’s Operation Aspida 
and completion of a border fence. The eventual result was that refugees and other 
migrants were diverted to the Aegean Sea border, with similar numbers then arriving 
there but with a far higher death rate. 
By late 2012, however, these policies of containment started to show some cracks. The 
displacement of millions from Syria which had begun in 2011 started to impact on Greece, a 
country not only experiencing deep economic problems but also one with no functioning 
asylum system and which was effectively excluded from the Dublin scheme after the 2011 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) ruling in M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece. The ECtHR 
and subsequently the Court of Justice of the EU found that the repeated failure of the Greek 
asylum system to afford adequate protection was incompatible with European human 
rights law. Returns to Greece were therefore suspended: in effect, this meant that those 
arriving irregularly in Greece had a carte blanche to transit Greece and seek asylum 
elsewhere in the EU. The response of the EU and the Greek authorities was to police the 
Greek–Italian maritime border, in the hope that they would prevent further large-scale 
secondary flows that were already occurring through that route. 
Things were also beginning to go wrong elsewhere. In March 2011, a multi-state NATO-
led coalition began a military intervention in Libya which led to the fall of the government and 
eventual capture and death of Q’addafi later the same year. In the wake of the government’s 
collapse, Italy was obliged to suspend operation of its bilateral agreement with Libya and as 
a result Libya rapidly became the main departure point for irregular migration across the 
central Mediterranean. With multiple incidents of boats sinking and migrants drowning, 
Italy launched its own search and rescue operation – Mare Nostrum – in 2013, which 
saved more than 1700 lives. However, the scheme was abandoned in November 2014 when 
the EU refused to finance or support it. By that point, irregular arrivals into Italy were rising 
sharply, having reached more than 160,000 since the beginning of the year. 
The increase in boat traffic corresponded with an upturn in fatalities, including the 
Lampedusa tragedies of April 2015 mentioned at the beginning of this introduction. In 
response to the disaster, the European Council inaugurated the European Agenda on 
Migration, which explicitly pledged to take steps ‘to prevent further loss of life at sea, 
fight the people smugglers and prevent illegal [sic] migration flows’. Further to the 
meeting of the European Council on 27 May 2015, the EU initiated a number of  actions 
which reflected its long-standing ambitions to promote border management, 
cooperation with third countries and promise of refugee protection. It quickly provided 
€60 million in emergency funding to Italy and Greece and also published guidelines on the 
implementation of EU rules on the obligation to take fingerprints further to Articles 4(1) 
and 8(1) of the EURODAC Regulation. 
Yet, rather than restart the search and rescue effort, the European Council set its sights on 
curbing migrant smuggling primarily through a new twin agenda of criminalisation on the 
one hand and containment on the other. Hence, the EU committed resources to tripling 
the capacity of FRONTEX’s joint operations Triton and Poseidon, which aimed to secure 
the maritime borders along the central and eastern Mediterranean routes. One month 
later, the European Council passed Decision CFSP 2015/778 – legislating for a military 
operation, originally called EUNAVFOR-MED and later renamed Operation Sophia, in the 
central Mediterranean – which aimed to disrupt the so-called ‘business model’ of 
smuggling and trafficking networks. The EU’s focus on externalisation was evidenced by 
further aid and development packages. Most notably, it provided €30 million in regional 
development programmes for North Africa and the Horn of Africa and committed itself 
to establishing a multi-purpose centre in Niger, with the intention of  curbing flows 
across the Sahara Desert. 
In truth, the only elements of the European Agenda that reflected the stated interest in 
protecting human rights were the schemes for refugee relocation and resettlement. These 
initiatives initially aimed to relocate 40,000 people from Italy and Greece and resettle an 
additional 20,000 people from outside the EU. Although the number of beneficiaries was just 
a tiny fraction of those in need of international protection, the idea of a pan-European 
resettlement scheme was heralded as a major political achievement. 
Alongside the relocation and resettlement schemes, the EU also instituted ‘hotspots’ in Italy 
and Greece to process more efficiently the claims of asylum seekers who arrived by boat or 
were intercepted by military and civilian patrols. The hotspot approach was 
characterized as an innovative way of managing the increasing volume of arrivals in 
Greece and Italy, even though their operation was never defined in EU law and as a 
result, the systems in the two countries operated very differently (D’Angelo et al. 2017). 
Centres on the Greek islands of Lesvos, Samos, Chios, Leros and Kos rapidly deteriorated into 
overcrowded closed facilities in contrast to more open processing centres in Sicily 
(Lampedusa, Trapani and Pozzallo) (see D’Angelo, this volume; Vradis and Papousi, this 
volume). 
Although the precise content of the European Agenda became more defined over late 2015 
and 2016 with further meetings of the European Council, there was little change in the 
design of the main policy pillars – which emphasised the need to police and curb flows using 
FRONTEX and national agencies, and the management of arrivals through hotspots, assisted 
by the European Asylum Support Office (EASO). At the same time, the EU produced lists and 
action plans to inform potential returns to designated ‘safe countries of origin’ and, as 
before, the carrot of development assistance was offered to more countries of origin in 
return for cooperation in controlling irregular migration. The EU also com- mitted 
significant funds to support the UNHCR and World Food Programme as well as setting up 
Trust Funds for Africa and Syria. The relocation scheme was expanded to provide for up 
to 120,000 people to be relocated, although in practice the numbers that could benefit 
were severely limited by restricting eligibility to those nationalities with an EU asylum 
recognition rate of more than 75% (see Kofman, this volume). 
While the EU was testing out its new migration policies, more than 850,000 asylum 
seekers – predominantly Syrians, along with Afghans and Iraqis – rapidly transited 
through Greece to gain entry to the EU via non-EU Balkan countries. The destination of 
the majority of these migrants was Germany, a country where the Chancellor Angela 
Merkel had publicly announced that Syrian refugees would be welcome. Yet, the creation of 
the ‘Balkan route’ generated new political crises as states responded one after the other by 
closing their borders. As a result, the operation of the Common European Asylum System, 
the Dublin Regulation and the functioning of the Schengen Agreement (permit- ting 
passport-free movement of nationals of contracting states) were all called into question. 
Moreover, the decision by Hungary in September 2015 to build a fence along its borders 
with Serbia and Croatia, tore at the EU’s claims of solidarity. Not only did the Hungarian 
border fence divert refugees and other migrants into countries that had previously received 
few arrivals, and were therefore ill-equipped to respond, but more importantly this action set 
the scene for further coercive attempts at border management across the EU and among its 
neighbours. 
By October 2015, around 10,000 people were arriving on the Greek islands every day with no 
sign that the flow would decrease any time soon. It was against this background that the 
European Council initiated a joint action plan with Turkey which paved the way for further 
significant transfers of financial assistance and the framework for what would become the 
EU-Turkey agreement, implemented in March 2016 with the specific – and explicitly stated 
– objective of reducing the number of refugees and other migrants arriving in EU 
territory. At the same time, one by one, Greece’s western neighbours followed Hungary’s 
example and closed their borders. By 8 March 2016, all the Balkan borders were closed 
for asylum seekers wishing to exit Greece. Tens of thousands of people became blocked 
at different borders in Europe, or in temporary makeshift  camps established while 
they –  and p a n i c -stricken governments across Europe –  decided what to do next. 
In March 2016, the eastern border with Turkey was formally closed subsequent to an 
agreement of 18 March. The so-called EU-Turkey Statement determined inter alia that all 
irregular migrants and rejected asylum seekers arriving in Greece after the cut-off date of 20 
March would be returned to Turkey; that for every Syrian returned from Greece another 
would be resettled directly from Turkey to the EU (with a complex proviso that initially 
18,000 would be resettled, followed by potentially another 54,000); that Turkey would 
take measures to prevent all irregular migration from Turkey to the EU; and that an 
allocated funding of €3bn from the Facility for Refugees in Turkey would be available, with 
another potential €3bn up to the end of 2018. 
While the agreement between the EU and Turkey contained the eastern border of 
Europe, it also generated new protection challenges for the thousands of stranded refugees 
and other migrants caught between inhospitable national borders or in informal and pre- 
carious settlements. Over 4000 asylum seekers languished, some for over a year, in closed 
detention centres in Moria on Lesvos. Others were stuck in Serbia while those who had 
reached Calais, and possibly had hoped to cross to the UK, experienced repeated abuse by 
the French police and saw their settlements destroyed. 
The central Mediterranean route via Libya had remained open during 2016, utilised by 
refugees and migrants primarily from countries of West, Central and East Africa. Following 
the success of the EU-Turkey agreement in stemming the flow of refugees and other 
migrants from Turkey to Greece, Europe’s politicians were keen to replicate it with Libya – to 
stop the arrival of people into Italy. However, since Libya does not possess a coherent 
government and is also a dangerous place for refuges and other migrants, the EU’s 
arrangement with Turkey could not simply be replicated. In early 2017, Italy concluded a 
b i l a t e r a l  Memorandu m of Und erst and ing  with L i b y a ’ s  UN-backed 
govern ment  headed by al-Sarraj, which at the February 2017 EU summit in Malta was 
endorsed by the EU as a whole (see Baldwin-Edwards and Lutterbeck, this volume). This 
bilateral deal was followed up with unspecified deals made between Italy and local 
governments in Libya, allegedly paying off militia groups engaged in the trafficking and 
smuggling of migrants to Italy. By July 2017, the flow of refugees and other migrants started to 
diminish, and the deal was enthusiastically hailed as another success in blocking a major 
migration route into the EU. 
Thus, by 2017 the EU’s external migration policy was focused primarily on sealing Turkey 
and Libya as the two main transit routes into Europe, the continuation of promoting 
capacity-building of non-EU countries in the Mediterranean region to host refugees and 
other migrants alongside blocking migration flows and addressing the ‘root causes’ of 
migration in countries of origin. Irregular flows into Italy and Greece continued, albeit at 
lower levels, with weak capacity of these two countries to host and manage the mixed 
flows, while the actual protection afforded those in Libya, Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, 
Egypt and other countries of the region remained unknown.  In the case of Libya, the 
main transit country of the central Mediterranean route, the experiences of refugees and 
other migrants have been increasingly well-documented with widely reported incidents of 
kidnapping, forced labour, torture and death (Crawley et al. 2018). 
The gap between evidence and policy 
Why then, given the history of migration to Europe and the plethora of evidence that has 
been produced across the EU and made available to policymakers, has the EU response to the 
‘migration crisis’ been so problematic? There are several possible explanations for this, not 
least the many problems and paradoxes inherent in the concept of EBP. For the purpose 
of this introduction, it is worth highlighting three particular issues that explain, in large 
part, the ongoing and substantial ‘gap’ between a significant body of evidence examining 
migration processes including the drivers of migration to Europe, and the policy 
response. 
First, it is important to note that the gap between evidence on the drivers of migration to 
Europe and the policy response is not limited or specific to the issue of migration. Rather, it 
reflects a deeper problem with the concept of EBP which parallels the long-standing 
‘paradigm war’ in social research between positivist, interpretivist and critical approaches. 
In particular, the definition of ‘evidence’ for the purpose of migration policymaking is often 
reliant on quantitative data and statistical analysis (e.g. as provided by FRONTEX) that can 
provide a straightforward numerical description of the issue(s) and steer the policy 
response in a specific direction, the success or otherwise of which can be easily measured. In 
truth, the world is more complex than this, and data in the area of migration and asylum 
policy continue to be subject to definitional and spatial limitations that are exacerbated by 
rapid changes and incorrect usage and interpretation (Singleton 2016). In other words, the 
nature of what counts as ‘evidence’ is itself contested and challenged. 
Secondly, it is clear – regardless of how ‘evidence’ is defined and characterised that research 
is only one component of the evidence that shapes and informs EBP. At each stage of the 
policy process, a number of different factors will also affect the policy-making process. This 
occurs both at an individual level – for example, a policymaker’s own experience, expertise and 
judgement – and at an institutional level, for example in terms of institutional capacity (Sutcliffe 
and Court 2005). It also occurs at the broader level of policy narratives – in other words, the 
story that is constructed about the role of a particular policy or set of policies and the purpose 
that ‘evidence’ plays in this process of narrative construction (Boswell, Geddes, and 
Scholton 2011). Boswell et al. argue that many aspects of migration policy can be characterised 
as areas of risk, with policymakers invoking different knowledge claims, sometimes based on 
evidence from research, other times drawing on management data or other forms of 
evidence to construct and/or support particular policy narratives. 
This takes us to the third, and perhaps most important, aspect of EBP – namely, the 
political context within which policymaking takes place. This aspect is how evidence is 
incorporated into policymaking, the stage at which it is taken into account and the use (s) 
to which it is put. The positivist, empiricist worldview that underpins the theory and 
practice of EBP has largely failed to address the key elements of the policymaking process 
and the complex social and political realities within which policymaking takes place 
(Greenhalgh and Russell 2009). In particular, a narrow ‘evidence-based’ framing of 
policymaking is inherently unable to explore the complex, context-dependent and value-
laden way in which competing options are negotiated by individuals and interest groups. 
Policymaking is, as Sutcliffe and Court suggest, ‘neither objective nor neutral; it is an 
inherently political process’ (2005, iii). Although this has implications for EBP across all policy 
domains, the politics of policymaking is perhaps nowhere more evident than in the area of 
migration and asylum – issues that have become deeply politicised at the national and 
regional levels. We note, for example, that in the case of the EMN studies, the emphasis on 
evaluation is often at the expense of critical insight. The studies tend to address the question 
‘How well does EU policy work in achieving its stated goals?’ There is little or no critical 
reflection, no attempt to challenge the stated goals or analyse why migrations are occurring 
and what the constitutive elements of ‘mixed flows’ of persons may imply for alternative 
policy responses. 
Following from the ontological biases listed above, it is helpful to consider the following 
additional explanations. 
Assumption led policymaking 
Throughout the ‘crisis’, EU member states – and in particular the UK – suggested that 
refugees and other migrants were drawn to Europe by a variety of ‘pull factors’, including 
better employment opportunities, social support, access to healthcare and other benefits. 
This emphasis on pull versus push factors is regularly asserted, with politicians making 
assumptions about the factors shaping migrants’ decision making – speaking for them, but 
not listening to their own accounts and reasons for deciding to leave or move on 
(Crawley et al. 2016, 2018). In addition, it is clear from the outline of EU policy developments 
above that European migration policy has been preoccupied with curbing irregular flows and 
addressing the criminal aspects of smuggling and trafficking. Despite consider- able evidence 
being presented by academics and by refugees and other migrants them- selves on the 
nature of migration to Europe in 2015, there has been an unwillingness to accept the 
complex and mixed nature of migration flows. In particular, there has been an 
unwillingness to take account of the overlapping relationship between ‘forced’ and 
‘economic’ drivers of migration, along with the fact that many of those leaving their 
home countries primarily for economic reasons have effectively been recast as refugees – 
for example, as a result of abusive and exploitative practices in Libya and elsewhere 
(Crawley and Skleparis 2017). As a result, many people have been excluded from inter- 
national protection. While Syrians have overwhelmingly benefited from both the granting of 
asylum status and participation in the EU relocation scheme, other nationalities have been 
denied such opportunities even though they may have equally pressing claims for 
protection. A recent survey of 700 people reaching Sicily and Greece in 2015 and 2016 
found that only 18% described themselves as ‘economic migrants’, the vast majority 
have come from refugee-producing states and who had escaped conflict and political 
turmoil (see D’Angelo et al. 2017). This evidence is in line with that of IOM (2016), which 
found that economic or work reasons were the main reasons for migration among 
only 24% of the 1031 refugees and migrants they interviewed. 
Interest led policymaking – a convenient ‘crisis’ 
Jeandesboz and Pallister-Wilkins (2016) argue that the 2015 ‘migration crisis’ cannot be 
treated solely as a crisis, since the solutions have built on pre-existing practices and 
actually helped to consolidate them. This is a view shared by Van Reekum (2016) who 
notes the phenomenon of ‘routinized emergency’ acting to ‘naturalize’ migration politics. In 
the case of the EU, such practices are well-documented. As we argue above, there is a line of 
continuity between the Tampere and Seville European Council decisions and the 2015 
European Agenda on Migration. The EU’s commitment to ‘manage’ migration flows is 
further evidenced in external policies that build on top of a raft of migration partnerships 
and schemes. The most obvious legacy of this approach is in the design of the EU- Turkey 
agreement. 
Furthermore, the events described above relate to an emergency situation which 
enabled the EU to expand its competences. Again, the focus on smuggling, irregular 
flows and the criminalisation of migration dominated the agenda. Blockmans (2016) sees 
the 2015 crisis as an ideal opportunity for the Common Security and Defence Policy 
(CSDP) to acquire a bigger role in EU policies – something borne out by the recent 
reconfiguration of FRONTEX as a semi-militarised European Border and Coast Guard. We 
might also argue that casting migration as a security issue, and addressing it through the 
CDSP, was a less problematic way forward for EU policymakers when con- fronted by highly 
divergent national positions on the management of external immigration flows. 
Nationalising migration policy 
With the creation of a ‘Balkan route’, EU member states took action to close their borders, 
and saw the pillars of EU policy – the operation of the CEAS, the Dublin Regulation and the 
Schengen Agreement – abrogated in favour of restrictive and nationalised policies that 
appealed to domestic audiences. In particular, Central European states – above all, 
Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland – presented their actions as natural responses to 
the inflows of migrants. These actions were defended in the name of border management, 
national sovereignty and social cohesion – the lexicon of populism. Thus, while the EU 
expanded its competences in protecting the EU’s external border, its internal borders 
hardened – to the benefit of chauvinistic national governments. 
Rewriting the rules of the game 
The framing of migration management as a ‘crisis’ has been used to justify extraordinary 
and exceptional measures, which can be characterised as rapid, informal and flexible 
policy instruments at odds with the rule of law and the fundamental rights of refugees 
and other migrants. The expansion and multiplication of borders – physical, 
technological and mental – is seen as the cause of long and fragmented journeys, 
denying access through legal routes and particularly problematic for persons seeking 
international protection. As Ansems de Vries, Carrera, and Guild (2016) argue, the 
fractured and complex journeys of migrants, and the dramatic effect of increasingly 
coercive policies where migrants are pushed back from one country to another, and 
borders become extended zones of hold-up, pushback and/or violence, fundamentally 
undermine the potential for settlement. The system works against the institution of 
asylum. 
The stories unheard 
This Special Issue engages directly with the complex relationship between evidence on 
migration processes and the policymaking process. What becomes clear from the stories 
they tell us about different aspects of EU migration policy and practice is that the aspiration – 
as expressed in the ESRC’s Urgent Grant Call – for robust evidence to inform the development 
of policy and responses by governmental, inter-governmental and non-governmental actors is 
not, in itself, sufficient to produce meaningful impact. The failings of the EU’s response to 
increased migration were not due to a lack of robust evidence on ‘what works’: rather, 
they occurred because this evidence was viewed as insufficiently convincing relative to the 
other forms of evidence available to policymakers. Such evidence was also over- ruled by the 
perceived political imperative of controlling and limiting migration. The articles in this volume 
begin by examining the internal contradictions in the design of European policy. One unifying 
theme is the problematic lens of ‘crisis’. 
Leonie Ansems de Vries and Elspeth Guild explore this concept through the perspective of 
transit points, which they describe as the kind of spaces that people seeking refuge pass 
through including informal sites such as railways stations, parks and ad hoc camps as well as 
institutionalised spaces such as reception centres, detention centres and hotspots. The 
authors describe how the ‘Jungle’ in Calais turned into a (semi-)permanent place of 
passage and residence owing to the closed border with the UK and how other spaces 
have become sites of significant human rights abuses where people are often detained 
unlawfully. Ansems de Vries and Guild also highlight the ineffective way in which transit 
points are used to manage migration flows, arguing that ‘eviction and destruction has 
not stopped people from moving through and staying in informal places’. A particularly 
important contribution of this article is its description of the ways in which policy frame- 
works structure the experience of migration. The result is that multiple and overlapping 
forms of coercive measures undermine opportunities for settlement and integration. 
The article by Vicki Squire and Nina Perkowski builds on this theme by taking issue with the 
European Agenda on Migration and the EU’s emphasis on tackling the issue of smuggling 
and trafficking. Drawing upon 257 interviews carried out with 271 people who travelled 
across the Mediterranean Sea by boat using smuggling networks, the authors look at 
the complex co-relationship between smuggling and anti-smuggling initiatives – arguing 
that the EU has been distracted by a focus on the criminal actors and actions that enable 
people to reach places of safety, rather than focusing on the criminal regimes that people are 
fleeing in their search for international protection. Squire and Perkowski note that, from the 
individual perspective, the absence of choice undermines a moral argument against 
smuggling and they unpick the logic of ‘good versus bad smuggling’. Drawing on concepts 
of ‘anti-politics’, they demonstrate how policies have emerged in response to the 
problem of managing ‘bad things’. While ‘good smugglers’ provide a service, ‘bad 
smugglers’ are considered to be ‘interested only in financial gain, and potentially cheating, 
threatening, abusing, or risking the lives of their “customers” to maximise their profits’. In 
this way, Squire and Perkowski’s article highlights a plurality of approaches to smuggling, 
some of which may involve cooperation with smugglers and reduce rather than increase 
harm. These counter-narratives expose the limitations of the EU’s approach to the issue of 
smuggling. Squire and Perkowski further explain that rather than functioning as a consistent 
and logical set of operations trying to curb the exploitative practice of human smuggling, the 
EU’s approach has in fact given way to a series of con- tested practices that seek to 
transform migrant smuggling networks from ‘low risk, high return’ operations into ‘high 
risk, low return’ ones’ – with devastating consequences for refugees and other migrants 
caught in the middle. They argue that the EU’s legitimacy may be called into question by 
the rising number of deaths at sea, in spite of increasingly sophisticated intelligence 
networks. 
Eleonore Kofman similarly seeks to deconstruct EU policy and expose its underlying biases – 
in this instance, the designation of vulnerability and the gendered implications for the EU’s 
relocation scheme. Exploring the nature of ‘gendered mobilities’, Kofman argues that the 
absence of socially disaggregated data for differentiating between the needs of adults and 
children masks a wider challenge in the conceptualisation of categories of vulnerability. It is not 
just women and children as a whole who are classified as vulnerable, but sub-categories such as 
pregnant women, single parents or unaccompanied minors who are deemed to be the most 
dependent and in need of additional support and who should be given priority in terms of 
reception support and relocation. The application of ‘vulnerability’ to the reception of 
asylum seekers and the privileging of certain nationalities for relocation has created a series of 
hierarchies and stratifications. Drawing upon empirical data from UNHCR and national 
sources in Greece and Italy as well as original data generated by the EVI-MED project, 
Kofman argues that, in practice, the way in which people are deemed to be vulnerable 
privileges certain categories over others. Those omitted tend to be those who have 
experienced emotional trauma. Kofman also describes how vulnerability is conceptualised in 
gendered terms, noting that the differences in the composition of flows between the central 
and eastern Mediterranean routes and changes over time have been used to exclude men 
from the category of vulnerable persons. The supposed absence or small number of 
women travelling to Europe has been used by anti-immigrant social media sites to argue 
that men fleeing conflict zones are cowards, unwilling to safeguard vulnerable women and 
children and therefore undeserving of protection. 
The article by Anna Papoutsi and Antonis Vradis focuses on the operation of the reception 
system, and in particular the use of hotspots in Greece and Italy, highlighting multiple abuses 
that undermine the EU’s claim to protect the rights of migrants. The authors argue that 
international protection systems for asylum seekers effectively cease to apply on large 
swathes of Greek territory. Hotspots allow the state and the EU to further separate citizens 
and non-citizens into categories of ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ and, through the use of 
pre-registration systems, manage their mobility by creating further ambiguous categories. In 
this way, Papoutsi and Vradis argue, the hotspots are liminal spaces that institutionalise 
mobility yet also facilitate the immobility of transit populations. The use of these sites 
results in a forced detachment between territory and population such that refugees and 
other migrants encamped in hotspots are no longer citizens, dwellers or bearers of any 
other residence-derived rights. They are simply populations passing through. 
Alessio D’Angelo, writing on the management of reception systems in Italy, similarly notes 
how the ’hotspot’ approach in Italy has turned the idea of refugee protection and 
migration management on its head – arguing that the institutionalisation of hotspots in 
Agrigento, Lampedusa, Taranto, Trapani and Pozzallo has effectively created an ‘illegality 
factory’. The Italian system of reception for refugees and other migrants involves a galaxy of 
state and non-governmental actors and a multi-tier classification of services and centres 
operating in an  overcomp l icat ed  system created from confused  and 
c o n t r a d i c t o r y  legislation. Yet, as in Greece where officials are assisted by FRONTEX and 
EASO, the hot- spots act as a sorting office. The process of illegality management begins at 
this point, because in spite of the notice of rejection given to many, individuals are not 
removed but ‘virtually expelled’ or assisted to leave, with gates to centres deliberately left 
open or – as with the smugglers in Squire and Perkowski’s account – the police facilitating 
their exit by taking people to rural areas so they can ‘disappear’. 
Building on the theme of the institutional facilitation of irregular migration, Franck Duvell 
examines the ambiguous role of the police and border enforcement agencies in the 
context of the EU’s agreement with Turkey. Drawing upon interviews undertaken in 
Greece and Turkey, Duvell describes the competing motivations of individuals, state actors 
and social networks in the flow of refugees and other migrants from Turkey to Greece. 
He identifies an assemblage of macro, meso and micro-level drivers which includes 
geographical borders, official policies, hostile and p r o -migrant d i s c o u r s e s , social 
processes, routes and movements, concluding that smuggling is symptomatic of the 
e x t r ao rd i n a r i l y  restrictive conditions that  r e g u l a t e  entry t o  t h e  E U .  Although 
Turkey is often criticised for supporting smugglers and, in turn, refugees and other 
migrants seeking to cross the Aegean, Duvell also records how informal structures have 
provided support – including mosques and NGOs – which help to determine onward journeys 
and cater to those left stranded. 
The problem of stranded migrants is further explored by Martin Baldwin-Edwards and Derek 
Lutterbeck, who examine the importance of Libya as a transit state and the situation for those 
crossing to Europe via the central Mediterranean route. The authors describe how the EU 
has accommodated abuse in Libya by tolerating a contradictory relationship between the 
security of the state versus the security of the migrant. Although the Libyan Directorate for 
Combating Illegal Migration is the ‘official’ agency responsible for overseeing the 
management of detention centres, Baldwin-Edwards and Lutterbeck argue that these are 
controlled by militia beyond the reach of the Ministry of the Interior. The 2017 
arrangement between Italy and various Libyan authorities has resulted in a large stock of 
migrants being stranded in Libya and in need of international protection – in a country 
where the UNHCR and the EU have almost no access or influence, and which is controlled 
by three competing governments with extensive militia activities and a recent history of 
extreme abuse and violence towards migrants. 
The final article by Heaven Crawley and Brad Blitz revisits the relationship between the EU’s 
policies of migration management and the use of financial aid and development 
assistance to control flows to Europe touched on earlier in this introduction.  They focus 
on the ways in which ODA and other forms of development assistance have been used to 
externalise the borders of the EU and to limit potential flows of refugees and other 
migrants from the Horn of Africa. Drawing on data from two of the projects funded as 
part of the MMRP – MEDMIG and EVI-MED – the article charts the development of EU 
cooperation with countries of origin, from the Tampere Council to the multiplication of 
development programmes and readmission agreements with third countries over the past 
15 years. Although these initiatives are purported to advance ‘a –common agenda’, it is 
clear that they are increasingly being orientated towards the political aspirations and needs 
of the EU. Drawing upon data from interviews and surveys with 128 people originating 
from Eritrea, Somalia, Ethiopia, South Sudan and Sudan, the authors argue that the 
development of regional cooperation initiatives, further to the agreement between the EU 
and Turkey, reflect a series of assumptions about the factors driving migration from the 
region – including the belief that poverty, not political oppression or human rights abuse, 
is a principal cause of outflows. Rather, the empirical data show that persecution, insecurity 
and the absence of access to rights – in countries of origin and neighbouring countries in 
the region – shape individual decisions to move onwards towards Europe and hence 
fundamentally challenge some of the premises underlying both the European Agenda on 
Migration and the idea that robust and timely evidence alone can shape the policy 
agenda. The authors conclude that a lack of coherence between the EU’s ambitions to 
control irregular migration and the prevailing rights-violating contexts in which the EU seeks 
to engage, threaten to create further political destabilisation which may ultimately increase, 
rather than decrease, outward migration from the region. 
In September 2017, the European Commission released a statement claiming that ‘good 
progress’ had been made in managing migration flows and encouraging all parties ‘to 
sustain and further accelerate the good progress made in managing irregular migration 
flows, protecting the EU external borders and supporting the frontline Member States 
under pressure’.11  This volume challenges the idea that the European Agenda on 
Migration is internally consistent and an effective means of managing the arrival and 
integration of refugees and other migrants crossing the Mediterranean. It also raises 
important questions about the future of migration policy in Europe, with the EU reliant upon 
Turkey and diverse actors in Libya to manage its external borders – both countries with 
significant refugee and migrant populations and with serious human rights concerns. 
There is increasing evidence that the logic of containment and ‘sorting’, which runs 
through many of the policy initiatives discussed in this Special Issue, is being applied in 
neighbouring states. This raises additional concerns about the EU’s position as a protector 
and advocate of human rights. For both the EU and the UK government (which has 
funded the research that underpins the articles in this volume), these findings are of great 
importance. Whether, and how, these findings will be used to inform the future 
development of migration policy in Europe represents a further test of our politicians’ 
commitment to EBP. 
Notes 
1.  We use the term ‘refugees and other migrants’ in this article to reflect the nature of 
‘mixed flows’ across the Mediterranean and the movement of people between categories 
across time and space (see also Crawley and Skleparis 2017). This phrase, coined by 
Carling (2017), avoids the implication that refugees are not also migrants and the 
tendency to privilege the former over the latter. 
2.  See IOM (2016) ‘IOM Counts 3,771 Migrant Fatalities in Mediterranean in 2015’, 1 May 
2016 https://www.iom.int/news/iom-counts-3771-migrant-fatalities-mediterranean-2015 
3.  See European Commission Policy Areas – Migration Research Platform 
http://ec.europa.eu/research/social-
sciences/index.cfm?pg=policies&policyname=migration-mobility 
4.  See European Commission Funding and Opportunities, 
https://ec.europa.eu/research/social- sciences/index.cfm?pg=funding 
5.  The Urgency Grants Mechanism is intended to respond to ‘rare and unforeseen 
events’ where there is considered to be a strong case for immediate social science research. 
Following a review of the scheme, it was decided that that Urgent Research Grants would 
instead be allocated on a strategic basis, with ESRC inviting calls for projects in areas 
deemed to require rapid action rather  than  waiting for these issues to be identified by 
academics.5 
Europe’s ‘migration crisis’ was the first topic determined to be worthy of such a response. 
See Economic and Social Research Council – Shaping Society – Urgency Grants http:// 
www.esrc.ac.uk/funding/funding-opportunities/urgency-grants/ 
6.  See Research Councils  UK,  Global  Challenges Research Fund  
http://www.rcuk.ac.uk/funding/gcrf/ and Department for Business, Energy and Industrial 
Strategy (BEIS) (2017) 
‘Policy paper: Global Challenges Research Fund (GCRF): how the fund works’, 30 June 2017, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/global-challenges-research-fund/global- 
challenges-research-fund-gcrf-how-the-fund-works 
7.  See Research Councils  UK, Global  Challenges Research Fund,  
http://www.rcuk.ac.uk/funding/gcrf/ 
8.  See Economic and Social Research Council Shaping Society (2015)‘£1 million Urgency Grant 
to fund social science research into migration crisis’, 18 September 2015, http://www.esrc.ac. 
uk/news-events-and-publications/news/news-items/1-million-urgency-grant-to-fund- 
social-science-research-into-migration-crisis/ 
9.  The term ‘third country nationals’ refers to individuals who are living in countries which 
are not their country of origin and who are not citizens of other EU Member States 
10.  The asylum acquis includes but is not limited to the Asylum Procedures Directive, the 
Qua- lification Directive, the Reception Directive and the Dublin Regulation. 
11.  See European Commission (2017) ‘Press release – European Agenda on Migration: 
Good progress in managing migration flows needs to be sustained’, Brussels, 6 September 
2017, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-3081_en.htm 
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